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ARE CREDIT SPREADS TOO
LOW OR TOO HIGH? A HYBRID
BARRIER OPTION APPROACH
FOR FINANCIAL DISTRESS
WILLIAM LIN
DAVID SUN*
Based on the works of Brockman, P. and Turtle, H. J. (2003) and Giesecke, K.
(2004), we propose in this study a hybrid barrier option model to explain observed
credit spreads. It is free of problems with the structural model, which underpre-
scribed credit spreads for investment grade corporate bonds and overprescribed
the high-yield issues. Unlike the standard barrier option approach, our hybrid
model does not imply, for high-yield issues with ﬁrms under ﬁnancial stress, a
reduction of credit spreads while ﬁrm value actually falls. Our empirical analysis
supports that when credit spreads are quoted abnormally higher or rising faster
than expected, unexpected changes tend to persist. Otherwise a signiﬁcant and
prompt reversion to long-term equilibrium takes place. This asymmetric pricing
phenomenon is validated with a method introduced by Enders, W. and Granger,
C. W. J. (1998) and Enders, W. and Siklos, P. L. (2001). The pricing asymmetry
could not have been produced by a structural model employing only standard
option. But it is consistent with a hybrid barrier option model. Our model char-
acterizes the valuation of debt under ﬁnancial stress and the asymmetric price
pattern better than both the classical structural and the standard barrier option
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approaches. It can be extended to the study of individual CDS for its better liq-
uidity than individual corporate bonds. This study provides helpful implications
especially for the medium and high-yield issues in pricing as well as portfolio
diversiﬁcation. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:1161–1189, 2009
INTRODUCTION
This study adopts a new approach of examining the behavior of credit spreads
to resolve problems with the existing structural models. Criticisms have been
that their prediction of credit spreads on a top-rated corporate bond is much
lower than the actual credit spreads observed in the market,1 as documented in
Huang and Huang (2003). On the other hand, Ericsson and Remby (2004)
found, among others, that the structural model overpredicts heavily credit
spreads for high-yield corporate bonds. Our hybrid barrier option approach
offers a resolution to these inconsistencies. Asymmetric adjustments of credit
spreads were commonly seen in the wave of recent ﬁnancial turmoil, especially
in its earlier stage. Empirical analysis based on our model explains well this
phenomenon of asymmetric adjustments.
The structural model of credit spread employs a standard option under the
framework of Black and Scholes (1973), which is a path-independent setup
and cannot explain well corporate security valuation under financial stress.
Based on the model of Merton (1973) and Black and Cox (1976), Brockman
and Turtle (2003) (BT) and Giesecke (2004) introduced a barrier option
approach to resolve this issue. We extend their approach and propose a hybrid
model to analyze the effect of barrier on the distribution of credit spreads.
Speciﬁcally, our extension of BT provides a framework to characterize asym-
metric pricing behavior of corporate debt at the presence of a barrier, especially
when financial stress is highly likely. Our modification on the liquidation
probability makes it more realistic and consistent with empirical evidences. The
standard barrier option approach assumes that probability to be 1 and overval-
ues the implied barrier option. It could cause unreasonably low credit spreads
for high- or medium-grade bonds, or predict a reduction of spreads while ﬁrm
value is actually falling. We have also incorporated the effect of corporate 
capital gains tax, following Lerner and Wu (2005). The validity of this frame-
work indicates that the structural approach could have prescribed lower than
needed credit spreads for investment grade corporate bonds, but higher 
than needed credit spreads for medium- to high-yield corporate debt issues of
longer maturity. The resolution offered by our study contributes to the pricing of
corporate debt especially in situations where debt values are strongly sensitive
1Geske and Delianedis (2003) has indicated that recovery rate, taxes, asset value jumps, liquidity and market
risk factors could have contributed to the rest of corporate credit spreads.
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to credit risks. The inability of structural models to capture the nonlinearity
embedded in a barrier option can be further supported by our empirical evi-
dences. When credit spreads are quoted abnormally higher than expected, they
tend to persist. Otherwise the reversion to long-term equilibrium is signiﬁcant
and prompt. The pricing asymmetry could not have been produced by a struc-
tural model employing only a standard option, or by a standard barrier option
model. Our hybrid barrier option model proves to be an appropriate one to gen-
erate reasonable behavior of credit spreads both statically and dynamically. It
characterizes the valuation of debt under ﬁnancial stress and the asymmetric
price pattern better than both the classical structural models and the standard
barrier option approaches.
Classical structural approach assumes no default prior to maturity and
hence overlooks the related pricing behavior for a debt claim with imminent
default before expiration. Extensions by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) allowed preexpiration defaults but were
found to only explain 15 to 25% of the observed credit spreads according to
Huang and Huang (2003) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001).
Considering risky debt as including a down-and-in call (DIC) option, Giesecke
(2004) showed that if the empirical value of a bond reﬂects that of a portfolio
composed of a risk-free loan, a short European put and a long DIC, then the
classical structural approach would have undervalued the debt and overpre-
scribed credit spread. If the barrier is nontrivial empirically, then the value of DIC
at different ﬁrm values, as well as its term structure, would affect credit spread
correspondingly. The crucial feature of nonlinearity of DIC in firm value 
suggests that the behavior of credit spread can be substantially apart from the
structural model where the debt value is driven only by an option linear in ﬁrm
values. BT showed that the barriers for DIC are not only nontrivial, but also
substantially high, which implies prematurity risk structure of a corporate debt
would have been quite different from what we learn from the structural
approaches. But BT assumes a sure liquidation at default, which could overval-
ues the DIC and produce a credit spread that is inconsistent with market reality.
As the corporate capital gains tax shield could potentially raise default barrier
according to Lerner and Wu (2005), their extension on DIC produces implica-
tions on credit spreads consistent with empirical observations. If, however, alter-
native structural credit spread models, see for example Leland (2004), Giesecke
and Goldberg (2008) and Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2001), can
establish the default to be a major component of credit spreads, then it would be
crucial to adopt a modiﬁed structural model with DIC, which prescribes credit
spread according to realistic risk structure of defaults.
One assumption implicit in the BT and other barrier option models is that
liquidation or change of corporate control takes place once a prespeciﬁed barrier
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is reached for the value of a ﬁrm. As Broadie, Chernov and Sundaresan (2007)
indicated, that is not always the case in practice. Firms can, in theory and prac-
tice, go through a “successful” bankruptcy by clearing defaults with ﬁnancial
arrangements. Our analysis also indicates that BT’s assumption on liquidation
would have predicted unreasonable debt values and implied credit spreads. We
therefore relax that assumption to allow for a partial liquidation scenario,
which proves to be crucial in arriving at credit spreads consistent with com-
monly observed market quotes. Our hybrid model thus retains certain features
of the classical approach while stressing partial nonlinearity characteristic of
the barrier option model. For ﬁnancial stress with low probability of liquidation
or debt issues with low credit risk, our model behaves better than one with a
100% liquidation probability. Alternatively, our hybrid model still preserves the
property of barrier option model in capturing risk premium for a jump-to-
default scenario in ﬁrm value.
In terms of empirical investigations, BT studied stock prices of a large
cross-section of ﬁrms to support the existence of a barrier that justiﬁes a frame-
work with DIC. Other studies have focused on pricing kernel, term structure
and default barrier behavior. In this study, we try to establish the validity of this
framework by examining market behavior from the side of corporate debt. With
respect to default caused by jumps in ﬁrm values, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein,
and Helwege (2003) have argued that contagion in default predictions could
generate a market-wide increase of credit spreads, as seen in the recent ﬁnan-
cial markets. So we use corporate bond indices to extract barrier effects from
the bond market to capture the effects of potential ﬁrm value shift and to avoid
potential individual noises. To the extent that default probabilities computed
from a barrier-based model are better predictors for corporate bankruptcy as
argued in BT, our investigation provides a more appropriate characterization of
credit spreads. They would have been too low in cases of low credit risks, but too
high in cases of ultra high credit risks, under structural models than what
underlying credit risks should dictate. Although Giesecke (2004) indicates that
default probability for a low-quality ﬁrm under the barrier option model is high-
er than that of the classical approach, the embedded DIC prevents equityhold-
ers, the put buyers, from depleting ﬁrm assets before maturity. This change of
risk structure in turn reduces credit spread needed to be received by debthold-
ers for risk compensation. In terms of the issue of tax, for a top quality ﬁrm
where a default is highly unlikely to happen, credit spreads would be a little
higher as debt value added by DIC does not fully cover the reduction caused by
corporate capital gains tax shield at default.
We have examined further in this study the dynamics of credit spreads in
responses to state variables to determine how observed spreads compensate
credit risks and react to noises. Our evidences suggest that default barrier 
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produces asymmetric price adjustments at different levels of credit risks. The
error correction or reversion for larger or positive innovations tends to be weak,
whereas the correction for smaller of negative innovations is much stronger. Our
results are consistent with that of Barnhill, Joutz and Maxwell (2000), which
suggests that high-yield corporate bond indices revert slowly toward equilibrium.
When the underlying state is such that bankruptcy is highly likely to happen, that
is, when the DIC embedded in a debt claim is close to be in-the-money, the
observed credit spreads reverts weakly or slowly to an equilibrium path. This phe-
nomenon is typical of the high-yield ﬁxed income market in the recent ﬁnancial
turmoil well into the year of 2009. On the other hand, the adjustment back to
equilibrium is quick and signiﬁcant when the DIC is well out-of-the-money. The
asymmetry of price adjustments appears only within the systematic part of credit
spreads, meaning the change of credit risk proﬁle comes primarily from the sys-
tematic risk factors, such as interest rate or economic uncertainty. The empirical
examination of a long time series of corporate indices veriﬁes our simulation on a
hybrid barrier option model. The validity of our model suggests that neither the
structural nor the standard barrier option approach is completely ideal for ana-
lyzing corporate credit spreads. The structural approach not only misprescribes
required spreads, but it fails to capture the nonlinear effects of credit risk in the
neighborhood of potential ﬁnancial distress when debt pricing is especially sensi-
tive. The situation is more severe for debt issued by ﬁrms with higher credit risks
or at time of excessive asset volatility, as well as issues with longer time to matu-
rity. On the other hand, the standard barrier option approach overpredicts the
probability of liquidation and hence overvalues the DIC option. Resulting credit
spreads would have been lower than needed.
Our results, thus, have the following implications. First, a barrier option
model should be adopted in pricing especially high-yield or long-term corporate
debt issues. Our hybrid model, however, performs realistically better than a
standard barrier model, especially in the case of low credit risk or on short-term
issues. Secondly, debt pricing should take into account the asymmetric adjust-
ment pattern of credit spread as it provides useful information on relative risk-
iness of corporate debt within broad categories. Thirdly, corporate credit
spreads for issues with immediate ﬁnancial stress may have been too high and
need to be recalibrated with a barrier model. Our modiﬁcation can be extended
to the study of individual CDS as its good liquidity may allow our model cap-
turing asymmetric pricing behavior more efficiently. The remainder of the
study is organized as follows. The second section describes the barrier option
model and how credit spreads are to be affected by its introduction. The third
section describes our data and empirical analysis. The fourth section provides
discussion on issues, implications and possible extension of our results. The
last section concludes the paper.
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A HYBRID BARRIER OPTION FRAMEWORK OF
CREDIT SPREADS
According to the barrier option model of Merton (1973) and the ﬁrst-passage
model introduced by Black and Cox (1976), the market value of a ﬁrm’s equity
can be characterized as the value of a European down-and-out call option on
the ﬁrm’s asset value, and the value of a corporate debt claim as embedding a
European DIC option. The sum of the two is the value of a standard call (SC)
option. The DIC, representing part of the debtholder’s payoff stays out-of-the-
money if the ﬁrm’s asset is above the face value of debt. It gets in the money
and takes on the value of SC once a bankruptcy proceeding is initialized, and is
considered exercised if liquidation happens. Speciﬁcally, the value of a DIC,
using the notation of BT, can be expressed in Equation (1) as follows.
Assuming Vt to be the value of a ﬁrm at time t, H as an exogenous barrier that
triggers potential bankruptcy proceeding, T as the time of maturity, s as the
volatility of the ﬁrm’s asset and r as the riskless rate, then for X  H2 the value
of a DIC is given by
(1)
where
In this characterization, the equityholders have no rebate, meaning that
debtholders will take full control of the firm’s asset once liquidation takes
place. We discuss in this study only the case of X  H following the argument
of Huang and Huang (2003), which implies that bankruptcy is only triggered
when the ﬁrm’s net worth is negative.3 Nevertheless, BT reports computed bar-
riers as higher than the face values of debt,4 which, if valid, corresponds to the
case of overcollateralization or the presence of a positive net worth require-
ment on the ﬁrm. It can be found also in Leland (1994) where short-term debt
is rolled over to serve as a proxy for the positive net worth requirement.
The first term of Equation (1) stands for the expected value of the
debtholder’s payoff when the firm is in default, whereas the second term is 
b 
ln(H2VtX)  (r 
s2
2 )(T  t)
s2T  t
 and h 
r
s2

1
2
.
DIC  Vt(HVt)2hN(b)  Xer(Tt)(HVt)2h2N(b  s2T  t)
2The equation for X  H is more complicated and is subject to certain modiﬁcation of model as suggested by
Giesecke (2004). Detailed formula can be found in Brockman and Turtle (2003).
3Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), the ﬁrst in modern literature adopting an exogenous barrier in valuing cor-
porate debt, assumes that X  H, which does not allow a negative net worth. Huang and Huang (2003)
model the barrier as a fraction of the face value of debt as they argue that ﬁrms are allowed to run with neg-
ative net worth due to high default cost.
4They have reported, however, only signiﬁcance test result on the existence of a barrier rather than compar-
ing H against X.
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the expected value of loss that could be incurred if the firm’s asset is not
secured by the debtholders in case of a default. The value of DIC increases
with H for nonzero H’s. The earlier or easier a knock-out barrier is in effect, the
more secured the debtholder’s claim would be. The value of DIC for a given
time to maturity increases with asset volatility and equityholder does not nec-
essarily beneﬁt from it as in the classical structural approach. DIC value also
increases monotonically as ﬁrm value decreases till X is reached. In order to
characterize how DIC affects debtholder’s value, hence the implied credit
spread of the debt, we need to consider it in the context of an asset portfolio. 
A corporate debt can be considered as a portfolio made up of a riskless discount
bond, a short European put option on the value of the ﬁrm and a DIC. The
value of the debt at time t can be expressed as
(2)
where is a standard European put option. The third term
in (2) is a modiﬁed form of DIC in (1), with the inclusion of a liquidation fac-
tor d, which is less than 1 and can be considered as the probability that
debtholders actually take control of the ﬁrm’s asset after ﬁrm value falls below
H.5 In the original BT model, where d  1 as laid out in Giesecke (2004), it is
implicitly assumed that default ends up with surrendering corporate control to
debtholders all the time. Broadie et al. (2006) show that how ﬁrms in theory
can avoid that scenario and return to a solvent state after certain arrangements,
as seen in practice. So we introduce the hybrid model in (2) where debt value
is a blend of liquidating and nonliquidating situations. The liquidation factor
on the one hand reﬂects the reality that, even if ﬁrm value reaches the concep-
tual barrier, exercising a barrier option does not always happen.
With the addition of d, which is independent of V, the full representation
of this modiﬁed form can be rewritten from (1) as
(3)
where
Baldi, Caramellino, and Iovino (1999) and Barone-Adesi, Fusari, and Theal
(2008) have discussed barrier option pricing with a binomial approximation. The
approximated price of a DIC option is positively related to the exit probability, 
bd 
d ln(H2VX)  [r  (s22)](T  t)
s2T  t
.
DIC  Vt(HVt)2hN(bd)  Xer(Tt)(HVt)2h2N(bd  s2T  t),
P(s, T  t, X, r, Vt)
BTt  Xe
r(Tt)  P(s, T  t, X, r, Vt)  DIC(d, H, s, T  t, X, r, Vt)
5Broadie et al. (2006) formulated a model where some ﬁrms redeem their debt claims after ﬁling Chapter 11
and return to a liquid state. Only some of the bankruptcy cases end up ﬁling Chapter 7 for liquidation, where
the equityholders surrender all ﬁrm assets to the debtholders.
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or the liquidation factor d in our context, as shown in (3). Lowering d suppresses
on the one hand the potential value of debt when debtholders actually assume
control of the ﬁrm, and the probability of realizing that value gets decreased on
the other hand. If d  0, debtholders never force liquidation prior to maturity
and debt value would follow what the classical approach dictates rather than the
BT model in (1). As shown in our analysis that follows, without this remedy (or
simply assuming d  1) debt value may never decrease in ﬁrm values before the
barrier is reached.
The credit spread implied by (2) is given by
(4)
If the observed corporate debt is properly priced by the market and this
barrier option framework is appropriate, then the classical structural approach
must have undervalued debt as the value of DIC has been left out. Given prop-
er level of riskless rate, the structural model could not have ﬁt the debt value
properly without overassessing in (4).
Figure 1 plots the values of DIC of high- and low-risk firms under our
hybrid model at different ﬁrm values for various times to maturity,6 with corre-
sponding values of put and debt values under both barrier option and the classi-
cal structural models. According to Standard and Poor’s (2006), the 2002–2004
three-year median debt ratio of B-rated industrial ﬁrms is at 75.9%, so we set
the face value of the high-risk ﬁrm at that level. For the low-risk ﬁrm, we set it
at 37.5% as it is the median for A-rated ﬁrms. Following arguments of Leland
(2004), we set the default barrier at 73.1% of face values, which amounts to
55.5 and 27.4%, respectively for the high- and the low-risk ﬁrms. We have also
applied a volatility of 0.3 on a low-risk ﬁrm and 0.45 on a high-risk one. In our
hybrid model the liquidation factor d is set at 0.25. Regardless of time to matu-
rity, values of both the DIC and the put increase at ﬁrm values above the barrier.
After that, the DIC becomes a SC and decreases in ﬁrm value.
To the extent that the presence of DIC makes debt values higher than
those based on a classical approach, the difference is more signiﬁcant at longer
maturity and higher credit risks. So the classical approach would have pre-
scribed higher than needed credit spreads especially for high-yield or longer-
term debt issues. However in a BT model when the DIC grows faster than the
put, as in panel (b), (c), (e) and (f) of Figure 1, the presence of DIC could actu-
ally raise the debt value as ﬁrm value goes down if a liquidation factor is not
added in. In another word, the DIC could become too valuable, as in panel (f)
especially, to the debtholders to bring down credit spreads even when firm
SPTt
SPTt  log(B
T
t X)(T  t).
6We have considered the maturities of 3, 7 and 15 years. Compared with the 52,828 spread-widening cases
from Lehman Brothers database, which Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) studied, the shortest duration is
around 2.3 and 83% are averaged at 7.71. In this sense our selection is reasonably consistent with reality.
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value decreases. As this feature of the standard barrier model may not be com-
patible with reality and practice, our hybrid model offers the liquidation factor
d as a resolution.
This hybrid arrangement of the implied barrier option in (2) is crucial both
theoretically and empirically. For instance, consider a seven-year A-rated issue
against a Treasury note at 5.60%, when the ﬁrm value drops to 50% of that at the
issuance of the debt the unadjusted spread (the case of d 1) from the BT model
would amount to only 8 basis points in this case. However, the adjusted spread
(the case of d  0.25) from our hybrid model would have gone up to 98 basis
points instead, which is much more reasonable in a practical sense. Theoretically,
arguments by Huang and Huang (2003), Giesecke (2004) and Leland (2004) sug-
gest the case of X  H as in ﬁndings of BT is incompatible in theory with either an
exogenous or an endogenous barrier. Empirically, without the inclusion of d, debt
values and credit spreads would not have behaved reasonably under a model like
(2) as shown in this section. If BT had used market value instead of book value of
debt as well as a liquidation factor in their model, the stock prices they examined
would have supported a lower barrier and credit spreads more compatible with
market practice.7 Our calibration of the hybrid model also makes it an appropriate
one to apply in our empirical analysis in the next section.
With the risk-mitigating role of DIC, at ﬁrm values far away from the barrier
or at times distant from maturity, a speciﬁc debt would therefore be less sensi-
tive to potential jumps in ﬁrm values. If, however, the barrier appears to be more
imminent along the dimension of ﬁrm value of time, unexpected changes of ﬁrm
value may be cautiously interpreted. The smoothness feature of pricing a debt
via a put by the classical approach lacks this property. In this sense the barrier
option framework helps especially in characterizing the dynamics of credit
spreads. Figure 2 shows simulated ﬁve-year trajectories of credit spreads of a
risky discount bond with ten years to maturity at different starting ﬁrm values.
As there is no incorporation of corporate taxes in BT as well as in (2), 
the value of debt without a DIC can never be greater than that with one. So the
inclusion of a DIC can only produce lower credit spreads than the structural
models.8 Higher credit spreads would have been prescribed for investment
7BT indicated in the study that the economic interpretation of the implied barrier (69% of ﬁrm value) is not
without questions. In addition, for given market values of stocks the adoption of book value of debt could, for
a seven-year debt at a yield of 5.6%, have inﬂated the DIC up to 75% in that speciﬁc case. Implied credit
spreads caused by overvalued DIC and inadequate assessment of contribution from the DIC would be just
unrealistic.
8In light of Lerner and Wu (2005), we therefore modify (2) to take on the following expression,
(5)
where is the corporate capital gains tax rate. As raises the value of the put and DIC in (4), its effect on
the value of the debt depends on the likelihood of default, as well as the liquidation factor d. For given value
of d, Figure 2 would have been modiﬁed where debt values of low-risk ﬁrms would be lower than those with-
out incorporating and DIC.tcg
tcgtcg
BTt  Xe
r(Tt)  P(s, T  t, X, r, Vt, tcg)  DIC(d, H, s, T  t, X, r, Vt, tcg)
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grade ﬁrms than by the structural models. Without modeling a liquidation fac-
tor in (5), would have made DIC too valuable such that credit spreads could
actually go down at the occurrence of a credit event.9 For simplicity we have
presented in Figure 2 only the case without capital gains tax, which does not
affect the general pattern of plots. Panel (a) and (b) are plots of low-risk ﬁrm
group, or the group of A-rated ﬁrms, as speciﬁed for Figure 1. These plots are
applicable only in the context of a group of ﬁrms with similar risk characteris-
tics. In order to have a ﬁxed time to maturity while advancing month to month
with varying ﬁrm values, we could consider the plots representing the average
tcg
FIGURE 2
Simulated credit spreads for a risky pure discount bond as including a down-and-in call option 
at the absence of corporate capital gains tax.
9Lerner and Wu (2005) had to constrain the assumed asset volatility in their calibration of the structural
model they used.
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implied spreads for debt claims issued sequentially by firms in a group. The
spirit of this analysis is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2003) regarding contagion of default prediction for given risk classes of ﬁrms.
Panel (a) is the case of a low-risk group in a period of low asset volatility, whereas
panel (b) simulates the case of high asset volatility. Similar comparison is done
for a high-risk group, or the group of B-rated ﬁrms, as in panel (c) and (d). A ﬁrm
can enter or exit a speciﬁc group depending on its capital structure. Charac-
teristics of the group, however, do not change over time. Starting ﬁrm values
for each group are represented as percentages of those when debt claims are
issued.
All four panels in Figure 2 suggest uniformly that within each group if on
average a ﬁrm starts from a value very close to its barrier level then the average
credit spreads of the group would have less ﬂuctuation than otherwise when a
ﬁrm starts from a much higher proportion of the original ﬁrm value. This phe-
nomenon can be considered conceptually as that at very low ﬁrm value levels,
an exceptionally high credit spread would be considered as a signal of higher
likelihood of ﬁnancial stress. Credit spreads of debt issued by this group tend to
remain pricing in potential credit risks as the instantaneous volatility of the
DIC is smaller when it is or close to be in the money. Similar to this ﬁnding,
Barnhill et al. (2000) also reported speciﬁcally that lower-rated corporate bond
indices exhibit slower reversion toward long-run equilibrium. But the higher
the ﬁrm value goes; an observed exceptionally high credit spread is more likely
to be interpreted as driven only by noises, as the DIC is out-of-the-money and
its instantaneous volatility tends to be larger. As a result, the subsequent credit
spread tends to revert promptly and strongly toward the direction of the previ-
ous level. When the firm value is low, however, higher credit spread would
more likely to be considered as a reﬂection of greater credit risks assessed by
the market. The asymmetry is more pronounced for the high-risk than for the
low-risk group. Higher asset volatility also tends to amplify the asymmetry.
It is worth noting that a liquidation factor compatible with practice makes
the speciﬁcation of (2), and hence the results in this section, much more rea-
sonable. If we set the liquidation factor at 0.75, for the low-risk group (X  37.5%
and H  27.4%) the implied credit spread at 30% asset volatility and ten years
to maturity would only rise by 40 basis points when ﬁrm value goes down to the
face value of debt. However, setting d at 0.25 would widen that difference by
110 basis points, which is a much more reasonable characterization of credit
events in the spirit of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) where credit events were
deﬁned to have a jump of 200 basis points instead. In the case of the high-risk
group with the same asset volatility and time to maturity, similar situation with
a d at 0.25 would cause credit spread to rise from 125 to 166 basis points,
whereas a d at 0.75 would actually cause a reduction of 30 basis points in the
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spread. As higher value of d compresses credit spread, the asymmetric adjust-
ment pattern shown in Figure 2 tends to disappear with higher value of d. So
without the introduction of d, crucial implications from the barrier model may
not be consistent with reality, or not readily observable.
Compared with the implications of Figure 1, we can see that at states with
weak reversions, debtholders are more conﬁdent in DIC’s effectiveness in miti-
gating credit risks, and therefore DIC is worth more. So more of the debt
undervaluation caused by the classical approach should be corrected or more
credit spread needs to be reduced. On the other hand, when ﬁrm values are
high or away from the barrier, the DIC is unlikely to be effective and what gov-
erns credit spreads are noises from state variables. So less debt overvaluation is
corrected and less credit spread needs to be reduced. Our analysis in this sec-
tion indicates that the existence of asymmetric price adjustment validates the
adoption of the barrier approach. Credit spreads of high-yield issues would
exhibit stronger asymmetry than the low-yield ones. Accordingly, high-yield
issues may need to have their spreads reduced more as market is more likely to
ignore the role of a default barrier there. Moreover, common risks, such as
asset volatility affects the extent of the asymmetry of price adjustment and the
correction needed in overassessed credit spreads. The validity and magnitude
of these effects entails an empirical model of asymmetric adjustment, which
will be presented in the next section.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The Data
In order to investigate behavior of credit spreads for groups with speciﬁc risk
proﬁle, we choose to explore our model with corporate bond indices. Studying
indices also avoids possible liquidity effect10 within observations of individual
bond prices. We use the composite monthly and weekly yield observations from
seasoned Aaa-, Aa- and Baa-grade corporate bond indices compiled by the
Moody’s Investors Service, which are available from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. Each index contains various major corporate
bonds with different maturities.11 The data period starts from May 1953 and
ends in September of 2003. The spreads are computed by taking the difference
between the index yields and those of the 10- or 20-year Treasury Bonds.
Beside monthly and weekly series of the Aaa and Baa yield spreads, or SPAaa
10Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggested that “individual liquidity shock” causes a signiﬁcant portion of
unexplained variations in credit spreads of individual corporate bonds.
11Sun, Lin, and Nieh (2008) has pointed out that, after matching prices and maturity, average maturity 
of Moody’s indices is around 14 years.
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and SPBaa, we have also analyzed the difference between the two, or ISPBaa,
which serves as a naive proxy for idiosyncratic credit spreads.12 To conduct our
preliminary analysis, data is divided among three subpriods to examine poten-
tial structural changes in the capital market, with break points computed by
the algorithm of Bai and Perron (2003) (Table I).
The kurtosis and skewness measures of the levels of SPAaa and SPBaa for
the entire sampling period are not far from those of a normal distribution.
The naive idiosyncratic credit spread, ISPBaa, has higher values in both meas-
ures for the whole period. A separate analysis has also been done on the
changes of yield spreads, which exhibit excessive kurtosis also, a result simi-
lar to findings from Pedrosa and Roll (1998). Various studies employed yield
spread changes, which suffer from this problem.13 Our subsequent analysis
employs levels of yield spreads directly rather than changes to not only retain
information contained in the original variable, but also avoid potential infer-
encing errors.14
Preliminary Analysis
In view of Broadie et al. (2006), for a given firm the occurrence of filing
Chapter 7 or the likelihood of exercising the implied DIC is not an event that
can take place repeatedly. Also as indicated in the second section, it is more
appropriate to study the validity of a barrier-based model in the context of a
class of firms with similar credit risk profile. However, if we analyze instead
firms of a given risk class we would need to identify how the systematic or
unsystematic risks inﬂuence the barrier effect on credit spreads. Diversiﬁable
credit risks, as argued in Jarrow, Lando, and Yu (2005), should have little effect
on spreads of a large debt portfolio compared with systematic credit risk. So it
is crucial to identify the cause of higher asset volatility that induces a more pro-
nounced asymmetric adjustment or barrier effect as seen in our simulation
results in Figure 2. If it is caused by economy-wide factor, then we would
expect to observe according behavior on credit spreads on the corporate bond
indices in our data. Higher asset volatility arising from individual firm risk
should not have produced significant effect over time. To the extent of the
validity of arguments above, we consider corporate bond index to be a satisfac-
tory subject of our analysis.
12It also corresponds to a special credit spread decomposition scheme, one which implies u  1 in (7).
13Pedrosa and Roll (1998) showed that a randomized Gaussian-mixture models yield spread changes better
than a simple Gaussian distribution assumption.
14It will be shown subsequently in our study that applying changes only in a short-run analysis would also
miss the picture of long-run equilibrium, which only applying level of variables can possibly capture.
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TABLE I
Summary Statistics of Credit Spreads
Data Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
Panel (a): Monthly Data
Whole Period (1953:05–2003:09; 605 observations)
SPAaa 0.7424 0.5025 0.8038 3.3763 68.7207 (0.0000)
SPBaa 1.6929 0.7199 0.4505 2.6012 24.4718 (0.0000)
ISPBaa 0.9504 0.4230 1.3806 5.0169 294.7316 (0.0000)
1st Period (1953:05–1972:04; 228 observations)
SPAaa 0.3999 0.3020 1.5697 5.8254 168.4041 (0.0000)
SPBaa 1.1043 0.4869 1.4273 4.9645 114.1452 (0.0000)
ISPBaa 0.7043 0.2271 0.8487 3.7960 33.3872 (0.0000)
2nd Period (1972:05–1982:07; 123 observations)
SPAaa 0.5954 0.3223 0.1785 2.7081 0.0902 (0.5798)
SPBaa 1.8704 0.6173 0.4488 2.1725 7.6379 (0.0220)
ISPBaa 1.2750 0.5058 0.5538 1.9383 12.0640 (0.0024)
3rd Period (1982:08–2003:09; 254 observations)
SPAaa 1.1211 0.4589 0.5378 3.4725 14.6057 (0.0007)
SPBaa 2.1353 0.5629 0.8659 3.0761 31.8016 (0.0000)
ISPBaa 1.0142 0.3842 1.5594 6.7971 255.5334 (0.0000)
Panel (b): Weekly Data
Whole Period (1962:01:12–2003:10:10; 2,179 observations)
SPAaa 0.8326 0.5060 0.6205 3.2284 144.5698 (0.0000)
SPBaa 1.8334 0.6965 0.2762 2.7501 33.3652 (0.0000)
ISPBaa 1.0008 0.4324 1.2446 4.7654 845.5002 (0.0000)
1st Period (1962:01:12–1972:08:04; 552 observations)
SPAaa 0.4914 0.3752 1.1972 3.6907 142.8301 (0.0000)
SPBaa 1.2177 0.6058 0.9695 3.1201 86.8135 (0.0000)
ISPBaa 0.7262 0.2676 0.6388 2.9786 37.5555 (0.0000)
2nd Period (1972:08:04–1987:08:21; 785 observations)
SPAaa 0.6743 0.3799 0.1826 2.8240 5.3742 (0.0680)
SPBaa 2.0150 0.6455 0.4576 2.6890 30.5567 (0.0000)
ISPBaa 1.3407 0.4737 0.7173 3.0386 67.3687 (0.0000)
3rd Period (1987:08:28–2003:10:10; 842 observations)
SPAaa 1.2040 0.4455 0.8291 3.0897 96.7479 (0.0000)
SPBaa 2.0679 0.5422 0.9271 3.1943 121.9332 (0.0000)
ISPBaa 0.8639 0.2282 0.6473 2.4475 69.5049 (0.0000)
Note. Data in this table is constructed with Moody’s seasoned Aaa and Baa corporate bond indices and the ten-year Treasury Bond
yield. Monthly and weekly observation of Treasury yields are available from periods earlier than the corporate bond indices, but are
trimmed to ﬁt the time frame of the latter. SPAaa and SPBaa are, respectively, the difference between the Aaa index and the ten-year
Treasury Bond yield, and that between the Baa index and the ten-year Treasury yield. ISPBaa, the difference between SPBaa and SPAaa
is taken as a simple measure of yield spread contained in Baa index, which is not related to the Aaa index, or a naive measure of idio-
syncratic credit spread. The division of subperiods is according to results from the Bai-Perron procedure reported in Table II.
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To separate the systematic credit risk from the unsystematic one, we
would need to conduct a preliminary analysis as in Sun et al. (2008). We begin
from the following regression equation:
(6)
where denotes the change of Aaa, Baa yield spreads or the difference
between the two at period t, whereas is the change on three-month
Treasury Bill yield and is the difference between yields of ten-year
Treasury Bond and three-month Treasury Bond. Equation (6) is our Baseline
Model, as following Duffee (1998) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). They
found both estimates of bi1 and bi2 to be negative, which draws the starting line of
our analysis. Estimation results of this model are established as a benchmark
of inferences. First differences of original variables are used regardless of the said
excessive kurtosis in their sampling distribution. Table II reports the results
of OLS regressions of (6) on three series of credit spreads, for both monthly
and weekly samples. The division of subperiods is according to break points
found for ISPBaa, the idiosyncratic credit spreads of Baa (difference between
Aaa and Baa yields) from an endogenous multiple structural change algorithms
according to Bai and Perron (2003).15
Compared with various other studies, results from (6) are consistent with
literatures on how change of yield spreads respond to change of interest rate and
term structure. Generally, b1 and b2 should be negative and larger in magnitude
for lower-grade bond. The estimation results from weekly observations in Panel B
provide examination of effects from infrequent trading, as well as a benchmark
contrast to subsequent long- and short-run analyses. Our analysis in Table II
indicates that ISPBaa, the idiosyncratic credit spread of Baa, responds much less
to interest rates. Estimates for b1 and b2 are much smaller in magnitude in all
periods, and are at the order of tenth to twentieth of those for the full credit
spreads. Especially in the last subperiod, the b1 and b2 estimates for SP
Baa are
0.3666 and 0.3137, respectively, whereas those for ISPBaa are merely
0.0804 and 0.0227. Estimates for ISPBaa are insigniﬁcant especially in the ﬁrst
and the last subperiod, in both monthly and weekly samples. Especially, the
insignificance is even stronger when its sampling distribution, with positive
skewness and high kurtosis, tends to produce incorrect signiﬁcant results under
standard t-values. If the idiosyncratic credit spread is properly identiﬁed under our
¢TERMt
¢TB3Mt
¢SPit
i  1, 2, . . . , I; t  1, 2, . . . , T
¢SPit  bi0  bi1¢TB3Mt  bi2¢TERMt  eit,
15The Bai and Perron procedure does allow for the consideration of heterscedasticity and autocorrelation.
The number of breaks tends to be smaller (changing from 3 to 2) when taking into account the situations
above. Parameter estimates for (6) turns out to maintain their signs with smaller magnitude, regardless of the
number of breaks. The endogenous break identiﬁcation procedure has also been carried out for both SPAaa
and SPBaa, with locations of break points not far from what we have found for ISPBaa.
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TABLE II
Structural-Change Estimation Results of the Baseline Model
b0 b1 b2
Monthly, Whole Period (1953:05–2003:09; 605 observations)a
SPAaa 0.0062 (0.0088) 0.3049c (0.0242) 0.3376c (0.0261)
SPBaa 0.0439 (0.0121) 0.4302c (0.0278) 0.4459c (0.0341)
ISPBaa 0.0007 (0.0070) 0.1256c (0.0266) 0.1120c (0.0301)
Monthly, First Subperiod (1953:05–1972:04; 228 observations)
SPAaa 0.0129b (0.0058) 0.6284c (0.0510) 0.7128c (0.0567)
SPBaa 0.0145b (0.0070) 0.7014c (0.0562) 0.8268c (0.0682)
ISPBaa 0.0034 (0.0042) 0.0674 (0.0353) 0.1094c (0.0418)
Monthly, Second Subperiod (1972:05–1982:07; 123 observations)
SPAaa 0.0127 (0.0167) 0.2582c (0.0363) 0.2855c (0.0478)
SPBaa 0.0393 (0.0239) 0.5183c (0.0484) 0.5801c (0.0680)
ISPBaa 0.0266 (0.0155) 0.2602c (0.0380) 0.2947c (0.0498)
Monthly, Third Subperiod (1982:08–2003:09; 254 observations)
SPAaa 0.0078 (0.0072) 0.2862c (0.0502) 0.2910c (0.0319)
SPBaa 0.0154 (0.0090) 0.3666c (0.03002) 0.3137c (0.0252)
ISPBaa 0.0076 (0.0064) 0.0804 (0.0414) 0.0227 (0.0258)
Weekly, Whole Period (1962:01:19–2003:10:10; 2,179 observations)
SPAaa 0.0018 (0.0021) 0.4196c (0.0181) 0.4367c (0.0210)
SPBaa 0.0031 (0.0032) 0.5746c (0.0160) 0.5612c (0.0221)
ISPBaa 0.0008 (0.0022) 0.0680c (0.0188) 0.0630c (0.0173)
Weekly, First Subperiod (1962:01:19–1972:08:04; 552 observations)
SPAaa 0.0046 (0.0030) 0.8641c (0.0404) 0.8951c (0.0405)
SPBaa 0.0053b (0.0026) 0.8497c (0.0375) 0.9164c (0.0378)
ISPBaa 0.0007 (0.0015) 0.0144 (0.0199) 0.0213 (0.0220)
Weekly, Second Subperiod (1972:08:11–1987:08:21; 785 observations)
SPAaa 0.0011 (0.0027) 0.3778c (0.0170) 0.4035c (0.0251)
SPBaa 0.0019 (0.0037) 0.6089c (0.0250) 0.6180c (0.0340)
ISPBaa 0.0008 (0.0029) 0.2312c (0.0212) 0.2145c (0.0236)
Weekly, Third Subperiod (1987:08:28–2003:10:10; 842 observations)
SPAaa 0.0020 (0.0018) 0.4611c (0.0404) 0.3454c (0.0255)
SPBaa 0.0021 (0.0020) 0.4716c (0.0431) 0.3468c (0.0198)
ISPBaa 0.0001 (0.0014) 0.0106 (0.0152) 0.0014 (0.0188)
aBreak points and subperiod estimates for ISPBaa only are generated from the Bai-Perron procedure,
whereas all estimates for SPAaa and SPBaa, and the whole period estimates for ISPBaa, are from OLS
procedures.
bSigniﬁcant at 5% level.
cSigniﬁcant at 1% level.
A Baseline Model deﬁned as, , where stands for
the changes of yield spread measure of , or , the difference between the ﬁrst two,
and and are changes of three-month Treasury yield and the yield difference
between the ten-year and three-month treasuries, respectively. This model is used to estimate
endogenously possible structural changes over the sample period. The estimation procedure is
according to the speciﬁcation of Bai and Perron (2003). The number and locations of break points are
obtained according to results of sequential procedure in particular.The estimation has also allowed for
heterogeneity and autocorrelation in residuals, as well as AR(1) prewhitening prior to estimating the
long run covariance matrix.
¢TERMt¢TB 3Mt
ISPBaatSP BaatSP Aaat
¢SPit¢SPit  bi0  bi1¢TB3Mt  bi2¢TERMt  eit
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speciﬁcation, then it should not respond to interest rate, a state variable related
to common or systematic credit risks. Results in Table II are partially consistent
with this argument, given inﬂuences of other contaminating factors.16 The idio-
syncratic credit spread is only signiﬁcantly related to Treasury yields in the sec-
ond subperiod, between 1972 and 1987, when short-term interest rate is so
high that it often exceeded the long bond yields.17
Asymmetric Adjustments of Credit SpreadsTAR and
M-TAR models
Studies on credit spreads based on a time series framework mostly often sug-
gested that structural or regime changes resulted in observed nonlinearity of
the long-term relationship between credit spreads and interest rates. We would
adopt a cross-sectional approach by applying the empirical model of Enders
and Granger (1998). They employed the Threshold AutoRegressive (TAR) and
Momentum-Threshold AutoRegressive (M-TAR) models to study the asymmet-
ric adjustments of short–long interest rate differentials. The unit root test
results suggest that long rates respond only to positive lagged short–long differ-
entials, whereas short rates react only signiﬁcantly to negative discrepancies.
The nonlinearity in the long-term cointegration between the long and the short
rate is then ascribed to explicit economic factors, rather than exogenous struc-
tural shift of economic environments. In light of their methodology we will
investigate speciﬁcally how credit spreads behave along the dimension of cor-
porate ﬁnancial states, such as interest rates, which determine corporate debt
pricing and hence credit spreads. The barrier option framework outlined in the
second section provides us with a valid perspective in the spirit of Enders and
Granger (1998). Observing credit spreads over time helps understanding phe-
nomena presented in Figure 2 and second section.
In order to obtain a more robust implication from our analysis, we will also
examine on the idiosyncratic credit spreads for asymmetric price adjustments.
To better extract the idiosyncratic spreads we have made a necessary modiﬁca-
tion. As a naive scheme, we ﬁrst use credit spread of Aaa index as the systematic
credit spread, whereas for other grades the spread beyond it is proxied as the
idiosyncratic credit spread. Here we adopt a more general linear decomposition
function as outlined in Sun et al. (2008), which can be expressed as follows:
(7)ISPjt  SP
j
t  ujSP
Aaa
t , j  1, 2, . . . , J; t  1, 2, . . . , T
16Duffee (1998) argued that the reduction of callable bonds is the cause of lower interest rate sensitivity so
results in Table II could have been affected. Jarrow et al. (2005) suggested that ultra high interest rate, as in
the second subperiod, could be a problem in decomposing credit spreads.
17Duffee (1999) indicated speciﬁcally that this is the problem with of the type of reduced-form model intro-
duced by Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997).
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where stands for the idiosyncratic credit spread of the credit rating j, is
the full credit spread of that rating, at time t and that is the yield spread 
of the Aaa index. is the standardized long-run cointegration coefﬁcient
between and . The naive idiosyncratic spread deﬁned in the previous
section is only a special case of (7) with simply being 1. In the monthly sample,
estimated has been estimated by Sun et al. (2008) as 1.26 for ISPBaa, whereas
in the weekly sample it is 1.35 for ISPBaa and 1.2 for ISPAa. It will be shown that
this decomposition proves to be important in subsequent estimations and it’s
implication on the asymmetric adjustments of credit spreads is crucial.
To apply TAR and M-TAR models on Equation (6) where deterministic
regressors are present, we have to adopt the speciﬁcation of Enders and Siklos
(2001) rather than the original model of Enders and Granger (1998). First we
take the ranked residuals from Equation (6) directly and perform a long-run
equilibrium TAR and M-TAR regressions. We ﬁnd positive evidences support-
ing the asymmetric adjustment pattern of the residuals. Based on the residuals
and threshold from that model, we ﬁrst consider, in the case of , an error-
correction TAR model like (8),
(8)
where
along ranked series of .
This specification examines if there exists asymmetric adjustment with
respect to a threshold t18 on the residuals from the Baseline Model in (6). The
results for monthly data are shown in Table III. In addition, we also report 
the results from an error correction version of AutoRegressive Distributed Lags
(ARDL-ECM) model like (9) for comparison.
(9) f1SP
Aaa
t1  f2TB3Mt1  f3TERMt1  et
¢SPAaat  a  rmˆt1  a
l
i1
bi¢SPAaat i  a
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j0
cj¢TB3Mt j  a
n
k0
dk¢TERMtk
mk1
Mk  e1 if mk1  t0 if mk1  t f ,
 a
n
k1
g3k¢TERMtk  et
¢SPAaat  a  r1Mtmˆt1  r2(1  Mt)mˆt1  a
l
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g1iSP
Aaa
t i  a
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j1
g2j¢TB3Mt j
SPAaat
uj
uj
SPAaatSP
j
t
uj
SPAaat
SPjtISP
j
t
18The TAR thresholds in monthly data are respectively 0.166 for Aaa bond, 0.095 for the Baa bond and
0.059 for Baa idiosyncratic spread.
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TABLE III
Cointegration and Asymmetric Adjustment Estimations on Credit
Spreads, Monthly Data
ARDL-ECM TAR M-TAR
SPAaa (1953:05–2003:09, 605 obs.)
r1 0.0362 (0.0102)b 0.0147 (0.0123) 0.0035 (0.0123)
r2 NA 0.0785a (0.0274) 0.1228a (0.0285)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 7.6941 13.4395c
r1  r2
d 2.0280 15.1792c
tˆ NA 0.1301 0.1320
Lags ARDL (3,3) 3 2
SPBaa (1953:05–2003:09, 605 obs.)
r1 0.0689 (0.0115)b 0.0219 (0.0122) 0.0088 (0.0127)
r2 NA 0.0588a (0.0264) 0.1073a (0.0259)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 8.9199c 15.6762c
r1  r2
d 0.5227 13.6514d
tˆ NA 0.01660 0.1660
Lags ARDL (6,1,5) 5 5
ISPBaa (1953:05–2003:09, 605 obs.)
r1 0.0606 (0.0143)b 0.0592a (0.0168) 0.0854a (0.0188)
r2 NA 0.0572a (0.0251) 0.0278 (0.0219)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 11.0868c 12.3896c
r1  r2
d 1.6507 4.1693d
tˆ NA 0.0594 0.0152
Lags ARDL (3,3,3) 5 5
Note. The ARDL-ECM procedures are carried out for three sets of data, based on appropriate ARDL
models for each class of credit spreads. For SPAaa, the only independent variable is TB3M. For SPBaa,
SPAaa and TB3M are the independent variables and for ISPBaa, TB3M and TERM. The ﬁrst model is in
the form of
where l, m and n are respective number of lags for difference terms of the three variables and are opti-
mally selected, and et is assumed to be a white noise. The TAR and MTAR models follow the speciﬁ-
cations of Enders and Siklos (2001), with residuals obtained from the Baseline Model results in Table II.
The threshold model takes the form of
where Mt is deﬁned using mt1 for the TAR model and using mt1 for the M-TAR model.
aSigniﬁcant at 5% level under a standard t-test.
bSigniﬁcant at 5% level under a t-test according to the asymptotic critical value bounds outlined in PSS
(2001).
cSigniﬁcant at 5% level under a nonstandard F-test according to the asymptotic critical value bounds
outlined in Enders and Siklos (2001).
dSigniﬁcant at 5% level under a standard F-test.
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Though not from a model of asymmetric adjustment, the coefﬁcient r of
the error correction term in (9) serves as a determinant on the cointegration
relation among , and . Statistical signiﬁcance of r from (9),
a model of symmetric adjustment, validates the relevance of (8).19 The cointe-
gration hypothesis of the ARDL-ECM model is supported in Table III for SPAaa
and SPBaa, but not so for ISPBaa.
For the TAR model, the hypothesis of r1  r2  0 is rejected for all three
measures of credit spreads,20 suggesting that the cointegration of credit spreads
with TB3M and TERM is supported under the Baseline Model. Tests from the
t-stastistics indicate that r1 is not signiﬁcantly different from zero, but r2 is sig-
niﬁcantly negative. So at this level, our data suggests that reversions take place
at lower levels of credit spreads, but not so when they are high. This result of
significant asymmetric price adjustment is true for both full credit spreads
SPAaa and SPBaa, but not so for the idiosyncratic spread ISPBaa. However, F-test
on r1  r2 for the hypothesis of symmetric adjustments of to the error cor-
rection term , is not rejected according to a standard F-distribution for all
the credit spreads.
Alternatively, our M-TAR model adopts Equation (8) for regression with
the heaviside indicator speciﬁed as
The use of M-TAR is justiﬁed as the AIC and SBC values are lower. The
regression results for M-TAR in Table III show that the cointegration hypothe-
sis is still uniformly supported, with all F-statistic exceeding critical values of
the nonstandard F-distribution. As expected, results from the M-TAR model
are more pronounced, in the terms of Enders and Granger (1998), to ‘captures
possible sharp movements’ of the sequence observed. Here the results suggest,
in a more dynamic sense, that reversion is signiﬁcant when credit spreads falls
or rise slowly, but persistence of unexpected spread innovation tends to happen
when credit spreads rise fast of fall slowly. Under M-TAR the symmetric adjust-
ment hypothesis is not only rejected on the individual t-tests for coefﬁcients of
r1 and r2, but also strongly rejected on the F-test of r1  r2 for SP
Aaa and SPBaa.
The evidence for asymmetric adjustment for ISPBaa is not supported by the 
t-tests and also only marginally supported by the F-test. This is especially
important as ISPBaa is supposed to be the residual credit spread reﬂecting idio-
syncratic firm risks and tends to show up only when credit spread is high.
Mk  e1 if ¢mk1  t0 if ¢mk1  t f .
mˆk1
¢mˆk
TERMtTB3MtSP
Aaa
t
19The model is used in Sun et al. (2008) as an improved time series version of (7) to achieve better decom-
position of credit spreads. Equation (7) would only be relevant in employing inferences on r1 and r2 if (8)
produces a signiﬁcant estimate of r.
20The critical values of the F-statistic, which follows a nonstandard distribution, have to be obtained from
Enders and Siklos (2001).
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Therefore, it should not exhibit a reverting adjustment involving spreads at the
low end. Evidences from Table III suggest that the asymmetric price adjust-
ment feature of a barrier option model of debt is supported empirically when
we examine credit spreads of certain risk classes. Within such debt portfolios,
only systematic and nondiversiﬁable credit risk is relevant in characterizing the
barrier effect.
Similar procedures with Equation (8) and (9) are carried out on the weekly
data with results shown in Table IV. We have added analysis for credit spreads
of yet another rating, the Aa grade. For the full credit spreads of all three class-
es, the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment and that no reversion takes place
on the high end are again both supported. However, symmetric adjustment is
supported instead for the idiosyncratic credit spreads of the two classes of Baa
and Aa. For the purpose of illustration, scattered plots of credit spreads against
innovations under a TAR procedure are supplied in Figure 3. The reversion
pattern above the computed thresholds for SPAaa and SPBaa is clearly weaker
than that below it. However, for ISPBaa the reversion pattern seems to be much
more symmetric on either side of the computed threshold.
According to our discussion in second section, the existence of asymmet-
ric price adjustment is an evidence for the validity of a barrier option model of
credit spread. Our ﬁndings in this section strongly support the hypothesis. The
results from our analysis are consistent with the asymmetry of DIC volatility
with respect to ﬁrm values. When ﬁrm value is relatively low and the DIC of
debtholders is close to be in the money, the volatility of DIC is relatively small,
which corresponds to our results of weak or no reversion in the credit spreads
implied by the value of the debt. On the other hand, the strong reversion prop-
erty of credit spreads supports the observation of higher volatility of DIC as
predicted by Equation (1). These evidences are reported uniformly for three
classes of investment-grade corporate bond indices. Moreover, we have con-
ducted similar procedures for the idiosyncratic credit spreads of two classes of
indices as a comparison. We could not find the phenomenon of asymmetric
adjustment, which further conﬁrms that only the systematic component of cred-
it spread is affected by the stochastic state variables underlying Equation (6)
and other structural models.
RELATED ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS
Alternative Cointegration Equation
Alternatively, we could ﬁt an ARDL model in place of the Baseline Model in
Equation (5). According to the approach of Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001)
(or PSS hereafter), the existence of a unique valid long-run relationship among
TABLE IV
Cointegration and Asymmetric Adjustment Estimations on Credit Spreads,
Weekly Data
ARDL-ECM TAR M-TAR
SPAaa (1962:01:12–2003:10:10, 2179 obs.)
r1 0.0149 (0.0034)b 0.0060 (0.0045) 0.0026 (0.0041)
r2 NA 0.0156a (0.0066) 0.0395a (0.0089)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 11.7891c 19.4819c
r1  r2
d 0.5539 15.7783d
tˆ NA 0.0666 0.0574
Lags ARDL (3,2) 2 2
SPAa (1982:01:08–1993:12:31, 626 obs.)
r1 0.0961 (0.0224)b 0.0183 (0.0140) 0.0285 (0.0205)
r2 NA 0.0829a (0.0262) 0.0659a (0.0152)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 6.4939c 10.8782c
r1  r2
d 1.5212 10.1288d
tˆ NA 0.0681 0.0251
Lags ARDL (1,2) 6 6
SPBaa (1962:01:12–2003:10:10, 2179 obs.)
r1 0.0229 (0.0032)b 0.0037 (0.0041) 0.0002 (0.0037)
r2 NA 0.0129a (0.0057) 0.0367a (0.0079)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 12.3113c 24.2554c
r1  r2
d 0.3979 24.0226d
tˆ NA 0.0504 0.0905
Lags ARDL (2,2,2) 2 2
ISPAa (1982:01:08–1993:12:31, 626 obs.)
r1 0.0432 (0.0091)b 0.0608a (0.0159) 0.1131a (0.0295)
r2 NA 0.1019a (0.0253) 0.0547a (0.0151)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 11.6865c 13.1369c
r1  r2
d 1.1372 3.9380d
tˆ NA 0.0307 0.0358
Lags ARDL (3,2) 1 1
ISPBaa (1962:01:12–2003:10:10, 2179 obs.)
r1 0.0290 (0.0044)b 0.0301a (0.0054) 0.0249a (0.0051)
r2 NA 0.0292a (0.0079) 0.0467a (0.0096)
f(r1  r2  0) NA 21.3454c 22.9230c
r1  r2
d 0.0338 3.1284
tˆ NA 0.0371 0.0356
Lags ARDL (2,3,2) 1 1
Note. The ARDL-ECM procedures are carried out for three sets of data, based on appropriate ARDL
models for each class of credit spreads. For SPAaa, the only independent variable is TB3M. For SPBaa,
SPAaa and TB3M are the independent variables and for ISPBaa, TB3M and TERM. The ﬁrst model is in the
form of
where l, m and n are respective number of lags for difference terms of the three variables and are opti-
mally selected, and et is assumed to be a white noise. The TAR and MTAR models follow the speciﬁca-
tions of Enders and Siklos (2001), with residuals obtained from the Baseline Model results in Table II. The
threshold model takes the form of
where Mt is deﬁned using mt1 for the TAR model and using mt1 for the M-TAR model.
aSigniﬁcant at 5% level under a standard t-test.
bSigniﬁcant at 5% level under a t-test according to the asymptotic critical value bounds outlined in PSS (2001).
cSigniﬁcant at 5% level under a nonstandard F-test according to the asymptotic critical value bounds out-
lined in Enders and Siklos (2001).
dSigniﬁcant at 5% level under an standard F-test
 a
m
j1
g2i¢TB3Mt j  a
n
k1
g3i¢TERMtk  et
¢SP Aaat  a  r1Mt mˆ
t1
 r2(1  Mt )mˆt1  a
l
i1
g1i¢SP Aaa
t i
 f1SP Aaat1  f2TB3Mt1  f3TERMt1  et,
¢SP Aaat  a  a
l
i1
bi¢SP Aaat i  a
m
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1184 Lin and Sun
Journal of Futures Markets DOI: 10.1002/fut
Asymmetric Adjustment of AAA Credit Spreads, TAR Model
Residuals from the Baseline Model
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FIGURE 3
Asymmetric adjustments of SPAaa, SPBaa and ISPBaa to ranked residuals form the Baseline Model.
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variables, and hence a sole error-correction term, is the basis for estimation and
inference. Short-run or difference-based relationship cannot be supported
unless a unique and stable equilibrium relationship holds in signiﬁcant statisti-
cal sense. Both Neal, Rolph, and Morris (2000) and Joutz, Mansi, and Maxwell
(2002) have made extensive discussion over a positive long-run relationship
between credit spread and interest rates versus a negative short-run relationship
within a Johansen (1994) framework. The long-run relationship, which is repre-
sented by a cointegrating vector, however, needs not to be unique. Sun et al.
(2008) has presented in their study evidences for each credit spread series a
similarly unique and signiﬁcantly positive long-run relationship between credit
spread and interest rates, as well as a signiﬁcantly negative short-run relation-
ship. The validity of a unique (set of) long-run coefﬁcient(s) can be obtained by
passing a Variable Addition Test (VAT) on the levels of all the variables involved,
without having to resort to the result of a short-run oriented Vector Error
Correction Model estimation as in the Johansen (1994) model. In fact, accord-
ing to arguments on the crucial nature of level relationship and the two-step
testing procedures outlined in PSS (2001), the second-stage short-run estima-
tion is unnecessary and meaningless if the ﬁrst-stage long-run VAT is failed. In
this regard, our results based on (8) offer valid long-run results with ﬁrmer and
logically more consistent evidences than from a Vector AutoRegressive type of
models. More accurate decomposition of credit spread may help in identifying
systematic credit risk as driving a barrier-based model.
However, extracting residuals from an ARDL model for the TAR and
MTAR procedures in this study does not prove to be a good alternative. The
results are quite similar to those using residuals ﬁltered through Equation (6).
But the power of the analysis is lower. Although using Equation (6) without lag
adjustments is subject to certain time series problems, the performance in the
TAR and MTAR stages helps clarifying issues addressed in this study.
High Yield Bonds
We have examined the Aaa, Aa and Baa bond indices in our study. Our results
are then probably only applicable for the investment-grade corporate bonds.
Previous studies have shown that the pricing of noninvestment-grade issues is
governed more by default or nonsystematic credit factors, whereas Barnhill et al.
(2000) reported specifically that lower-rated corporate bond indices exhibit
slower reversion toward long-run equilibrium. Their findings are consistent
with the barrier option modeling of credit spread in this study. To obtain con-
sistent comparisons and evidences including the high-yield issues, we would
need to investigate credit spread behavior of those risk classes using the same
methodology.
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Individual Bond Issues
As the methodology employed in this study is based on speciﬁc ﬁrm class and
evidences are obtained from observed corporate bond indices, individual fac-
tors cannot be separated to conduct further detailed analysis. Studying ﬁnan-
cial variables, such as individual asset volatilities, operating leverage, industry
related factors and market capitalization in BT would be necessary to explore
how asymmetric price adjustments are affected by various individual risk fac-
tors. The range of firm values also has to be calibrated to see how instanta-
neous volatility of DIC responds to it. Detailed Monte Carlo studies need to be
carried out before further clariﬁcations can be made.
CONCLUSION
We have provided in this study a hybrid barrier option framework where an
embedded DIC option and a liquidation factor are both included in the pricing
of a debt claim to explain the asymmetric adjustment of credit spreads to inno-
vations. Compared to the standard barrier option model, the inclusion of a liq-
uidation factor avoids the problem of overpredicting credit spreads, especially
for high-yield bonds. Under this framework, the volatility of the barrier option
will be lower when the ﬁrm value is low and approaching the state of knock-in
barrier for the debtholders of the ﬁrm. The volatility of the option will be higher
at higher firm values where the barrier is highly unlikely to be effective. 
The implication of these phenomena is that the implied credit spreads will 
be more volatile at the low end of spreads, or when spreads are falling, where
little default risk is present, and less so otherwise. The adoption of our modiﬁed
version of the original BT model maintains partly the property of the classical
approach, which is especially more applicable for debt issues with lower credit
risk and shorter maturity. The property pertaining to a barrier approach
explains credit spread behavior better in the case of high-yield and long matu-
rity issues.
To test the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment of credit spreads, we use
two types of threshold autoregressive models to identify the asymmetric effect.
Beside a TAR model developed earlier, we have also applied an M-TAR model
speciﬁed in Enders and Siklos (2001). Our empirical results support the impli-
cation from a barrier option framework of corporate debt. Speciﬁcally, ﬁndings
from both the monthly and weekly data indicate that credit spreads of given
risk classes, when above a consistently estimated threshold, exhibit no or weak
reversion to long-run equilibrium as is forecasted by a cointegration relation for
innovations. But for smaller innovations there are strong evidences for quick
reversions to equilibrium. The results are uniform for all three classes of corpo-
rate bond indices utilized in the analysis. Moreover, further evidence suggests
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that the asymmetric adjustment property applies to systematic credit risk only.
The unsystematic credit risk, which is proxied by a decomposed idiosyncratic
credit spread, does not exhibit asymmetry in reverting to long-run equilibrium.
The result of credit spread persistence at levels of high credit risk lends itself 
to the recent market phenomenon in the wake of worldwide ﬁnancial turmoil.
Adoption of corporate debt valuation with the barrier option model appears to
be more realistic in light of it. We can also extend this framework to the analy-
sis of individual CDS as its good liquidity may allow our model capturing asym-
metric pricing behavior more efﬁciently. An analytic model for CDS with our
modiﬁed barrier option setup would be a good alternative to the standard struc-
tural model.
Findings from this work suggest that according to an alternative barrier
option model of corporate debt, the observed market credit spreads could have
been too high, especially when default risk is high. With the proper evaluation
of an embedded DIC option within a debt contract, credit spread curve may
need to be modified. Overall, with the theoretical framework and empirical
results of this study, credit spreads should be reduced more on the high end
and less on the low end.
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